CONFLICT OF LAWS: PENNSYLVANIA REPUDIATES
PLACE OF INJURY RULE, ADOPTS GOVERNMENTAL
INTEREST ANALYSIS
ACADEMIC ci~icism of the traditional conflict of laws rule that

tort actions are to be adjudicated according to the law of the place
of injury' has become commonplace.2 Increasingly, courts are breaking with this rule. 3 The question of moment seems no longer to be
I The traditional rule is set out in RFSrATEmENT, CONFLiCT OF LAws § 378 (1934):
"The law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal
injury." The conceptual basis of the rule is that any wrong is but a violation of a
right; that a right enjoyed by a person obtains by virtue of his being situated within
the state which protects that right; and that any forum which entertains an action
for redress of a wrong can only be enforcing the right created or protected by the
state where the right was violated. See 2 BEALE, CONFLur OF LAWS §§ 377.1-78.1
(1935).
Arguments made to justify the rule are: (1) it is relatively easy to apply; (2) predictability of outcome is enhanced; (3) forum shopping is discouraged; (4) it is
symmetrical-all parties injured in a single mishap have their rights adjudicated
by the same law; (5) there is lack of agreement regarding an alternative method of
decision, and the old rule enjoys the force of precedent. See Griffith v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796, 807-11 (Pa. 1964) (Bell, C.J., dissenting); 1 BEALE, op. cit.
supra § 4.12; Sparks, Babcock v. Jackson-A Practicing Attorney's Reflections upon
the Opinion and its Implications, 31 INS. COUNSEL J. 428 (1964).
Critics of the rule point out: (1) courts enforce rights created by their own
state, not foreign-created rights; (2) the rule mechanically ignores consideration of
the interest (or lack of interest) of each state in the outcome of the dispute; (3) the
rule ignores consideration of the reasonable expectations of the parties; (4) no rule
(or rules) can take into account the infinite number of possible factual variations
which bear on the interests to be considered. See authorities cited note 2 infra.
2
E.g., Coox, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws 3-47, 311-46
(1942); CutpuE, Survival of Actions, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAwVs 128,
137-40 (1963); Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 H. v. L. REv.
173 (1933); Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of
Torts, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 700 (1963); Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 679, 680 (1963); Traynor, Is This Conflict
Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 657, 667 (1959); Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215, 216 (1963).
Some courts have avoided applying the rule without completely repudiating it.
E.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (intra-family immunity
issue in tort action is local question of capacity to sue); Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.
2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) (issue characterized as locally governed matter of "estate
administration'); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (amount of damages a locally governed "procedural" matter);
Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959) (interspousal immunity issue in tort action characterized as locally governed "family law").
Other courts have entirely abandoned the rule. Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342
F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d
365 (1957); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 437, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963);
Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1964).
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whether lex loci delecti is to be retained or rejected, but rather what
shall take its place. Scholars who denounce the old rule have not
reached a general consensus as to the new order,4 and courts which
have abandoned the traditional rule have generally reflected this uncertainty.8 In Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc.,6 however, Pennsylvania clearly and forthrightly adopted a single rational approach to
conflict of laws problems.
Griffith was brought in the Pennsylvania courts by the executor
of a Pennsylvania citizen who had died in an airplane crash in
Colorado. The executor alleged damages on behalf of the estate
including loss of prospective earnings of the deceased,7 which are
recoverable under Pennsylvania law8 but precluded by the law of
Colorado.9 Had the Pennsylvania Supreme Court continued its ad'Professors Cavers and Currie apparently agree that conflict of laws problems
should be approached by examining the apparently interested states' concern with
seeing their respective policies effectuated in a given dispute, but they differ as to
the method of determining which state's interest shall prevail. Compare Cavers,
Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63
CoLuM. L. REv. 1212, 1219, 1225-26 (1963), with Currie, id. at 1233, 1237-38, 1242-43.
Professor Ehrenzweig joins Professor Currie in opposing the American Law Institute's
project of formulating new "rules." See Currie, supra at 1241-42; Ehrenzweig, supra
note 2. at 701-02. However, Ehrenzweig labels the governmental interests to which
Currie looks as "fictitious," preferring his own theory that courts follow certain "true
rules" which they have evolved. EmtENzwExG, CONFuCr OF LAws §§ 103-20 (1962);
Ehrenzweig, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of
Laws, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 1212, 1243, 1246 (1963). Professor Reese includes the purpose
of "relevant local law" as a factor to be considered, but lists nine additional consideratdons which may singly or jointly override this factor. Reese, supra note 2, at 682-90.
Courts declining to apply the place-of-injury rule have frequently done so by
categorizing the issue as something other than tort. See cases cited note 3 supra.
Other courts which have repudiated the rule have not indicated a clear successor.
In Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957), the court
recognized that application of the place-of-injury rule would frustrate the interests
of both concerned states, and concluded simply that on the facts before it principles
of equity and justice would be better served by not adhering to the rule. The
opinion in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963),
expressly repudiated the traditional rule, but was worded in such a manner that
each of the numerous critics of the rule was able to claim that the case lent support
to his view. See Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict
of Laws, 63 CoLum. L. Rlv. 1212 (1963).
1416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
7203 A.2d at 797-98.
sPennsylvania's survival statute does not limit recovery. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §
320.603 (1950). This is in accord with the Pennsylvania Constitution, which pro.
scribes legislative limitation of recovery in personal injury cases, except with regard
to workmen's compensation statutes. PA. CONSr.art. HI, § 21. Pennsylvania case
law allows recovery of a decedent's expected future earnings, less maintenance costs
for himself, his wife and his children. E.g., Skoda v. West Penn Power Co., 411 Pa.
323, 335, 191 A.2d 822, 828-29 (1963).
'CoLoADso Rxv. STAT. ANN., § 152-1-9 (Supp. 1960).
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herence to the place-of-injury rule, 10 the applicable law would automatically have been that of Colorado. Instead, the court expressly
abandoned lex loci delecti and in its place adopted "a more flexible
rule which permits analysis of the policies and interests underlying
the particular issue before the court."" Applying this approach to
the facts of the case, the court examined the possible interests of
each of the two states in having its law given effect in the case.1
Analysis of the policies underlying each state's law led the court
to conclude that Pennsylvania alone possessed an interest in the
measure of damages to be awarded in this particular suit, and that
Pennsylvania's law should therefore be applied.'3
The governmental interest analysis approach adopted by the
court in Griffith is, as the court noted,' 4 one advocated by a number
of contemporary scholars.' 5 The function of this approach-perhaps
its sole function-is to enable a court to decide in a rational manner
whether the laws of two or more states, with regard to a specific
10Pennsylvania courts had followed the rule for more than 100 years. See 203
A.2d at 801.
212 Id. at 805.
" Id. at 806-07.
2' "An examination of the policies which apparently underlie that Colorado statute
tends to indicate that state's lack of interest in the amount of recovery in a Pennsylvania court." Id. at 807. "Pennsylvania's interest in the amount of recovery, on the
other hand, is great." Ibid.
1
"Id. at 802-03.
"'The term "governmental interest analysis" as used herein is not meant to

identify the view of any particular scholar, but to describe the judicial approach
whereby the respective state laws which are asserted to be in conflict are analyzed
in order to discover whether the policies underlying those laws would require
conflicting results in a particular case. Thus defined, governmental interest analysis
appears to be espoused by the following scholars: Cavers, Change in Choice-of-Law
Thinking and its Bearing on the Klaxon Problem, in A.L.I. STUDY OF THE DIvISION
OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 154, 163-66 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1963); CURuaE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963); Currie, Comments
on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLUrf. L. REv.
1212, 1233, 1242-43 (1963); M. Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie's Restrained
and Enlightened Forum, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 845, 847-51 (1961); Traynor, supra note
2; Weintraub, supra note 2, at 216-17.
The court also cited Professors Cheatham, Leflar and Reese as "all placing importance upon an analysis of the policies underlying the conflicting laws and of the
relationship of the particular contacts to those policies." 203 A.2d at 802. Of these
scholars, Professor Leflar seems most to consider such analysis important, although
he appears to give equal weight to "the significant contacts" and "social policies."
Leflar, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws,
63 CoLus. L. REv. 1212, 1247, 1249 (1963). Professor Reese considers such analysis
one of ten factors which courts should consider. Reese, supra note 2, at 682-90.
What importance Professor Cheatham would accord governmental interest analysis
is not clear. Cheatham, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in
Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLuss. L. REV. 1212, 1229 (1963).
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issue, really are in conflict.'6 If analysis of the policies embodied in
the apparently conflicting laws discloses that only one state has asserted an interest in the outcome of the particular issue, there is no
conflict of laws relevant to the case; hence, the law of the only
interested state should be given effect.'1 If this approach seems
sensible to the point of being self-evident, it should be noted that
it is totally ignored by the traditional choice-of-law rules18 which
have long held sway 9 and which have only recently begun to be
subverted. 20 It should also be noted that some contemporary scholars
view the states' respective interests as only one factor to be con21
sidered.
While there is agreement among several scholars that apparent
or asserted conflicts should be examined with regard to the interests
of the seemingly concerned states,22 there is disagreement as to the
course to be followed in the event that the court's analysis discloses
a "true conflict." 23 One suggested approach to the true conflict
problem is that courts should "weigh" the conflicting state interests.2 It is suggested that if it is not apparent to the court that the

26 Ifanalysis discloses the presence of a "true" conflict (see note 23 infra) of state
interests and the court presumes to resolve the conflict by "weighing" the respective
interests (see text accompanying notes 24-29 infra), its analysis reasoning would seem
the basis for determining the "weight" to be assigned to each state's interest. On
the other hand, if true conflicts are to be decided by application of the law of the
forum (see text accompanying notes 30-35 infra), the sole function of governmental
interest analysis will have been that of determining whether true conflict exists.
'-

See authorities cited note 15 supra.

Courts following the place-of-injury rule may well give effect to the law of a
state having no interest in seeing its law applied, while failing to effectuate the law
of an interested state. E.g., Jeffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Wash.
1955); Bohenek v. Niedwiecki, 142 Conn. 278, 113 A.2d 509 (1955); Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931).
18
1n Pennsylvania the place-of-injury rule had been consistently applied for more
than 100 years prior to Griffith. See note 10 supra. Many jurisdictions still follow the
rule. E.g., Maloy v. Taylor, 86 Ariz. 356, 346 P.2d 1086 (1959); Workman v. Hargadon,
45 S.W.2d 644 (Ky. 1960); Hall Motor Freight v. Montgomery, 357 Mo. 1188, 212
S.W.2d 748 (1948); Clement v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 13 N.J. 439, 100 A.2d 273
(1953); Richardson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 11 Wash. 2d 288, 118 P.2d 985
(1941); Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954).
18

See cases cited note 3 supra.
21 See note 15 supra.
20

22

See note 15 supra.
23 The term "true conflict" is used herein to describe the situation which exists
when a court's analysis discloses that more than one state is legitimately interested
in seeing its policies effectuated in the particular case before it.
2' See Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and the Federal Courts, 28
LAw & CONTEMp. PROB. 782, 733 (1963); Leflar, Constitutional Limits on Free Choice
of Law, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 706 (1963); M. Traynor, supra note 15.
Professor Weintraub would also have courts decide conflicts on the basis of their
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circumstances of a particular case give one state a "greater interest
in the effectuation of its policy," a decision may nevertheless be
reached in accord with the "claims of justice."2s It is argued that
the making of such value judgments is no less a proper judicial
function in conflicts cases than in the numerous other contexts in
which courts daily weigh competing policy factors. 28 The Supreme
Court is cited as having performed interest weighing in a conflict
of laws case 2 7 (although it is admitted to have "retreated some29
what"), 28 as well as in other contexts.
On the other hand, a materially different view advocates that
a court confronted with a true conflict should not pass judgment
upon which state's policy it thinks should be given effect, but rather
should apply the law of the sovereign to which it owes its existence a°
Although the court should carefully consider whether the policy of
its own state cannot reasonably be construed so as to avoid conflict
with that of the other interested state,3 once conflict is found
proponents of this view assert that its resolution is a legislative, not
a judicial, function. 32 The Supreme Court has arguably abandoned
own value judgments, but he emphasizes that his method need not involve weighing
of interests. "[I]n viewing the entire matter at issue with circumspection and common
sense, a rational solution ... will very often suggest itself." Weintraub, supra note 2,
at 237-38.
2r Cavers, supra note 24, at 733.
20 M. Traynor, supra note 15, at 854-55.
2 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547-50 (1935).
The Court held that the full faith and credit clause does not require a state to
subordinate its own interest to the conflicting interest of another state, and that the
Court must "determine for itself the extent to which the statute of one state may
qualify or deny rights asserted under the statute of another." 294 U.S. at 547. The
Court articulated that its determination would be made by "appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of decision according to
their weight." Ibid.
28 M. Traynor, supra note 15, at 853. See note 34 infra.
22 E.g., see cases cited by M. Traynor, supra note 15, at 852-53.
0 CURME, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in SELECMr
EssAYs ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 177 (1963); Currie, The Disinterested Third State,
28 LAW & CONTENIP. PROB. 754, 758 (1963).
81 1d. at 757-58. Such construction with an eye toward avoiding conflict has been
criticized as inconsistent with proscription against weighing. When the court performs such construction of its state's policies, is it not engaged in a "weighing"
process? Cavers, supra note 24, at 734 n.9. Professor Currie concedes the functional
similarity, but sees an important distinction in method. "When a court avowedly
uses the tools of construction and interpretation it invites legislative correction of
error-or at least criticism from the law reviews. When it weighs state interests and
finds a foreign interest weightier it inhibits legislative intervention and confounds
criticism." Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 754,
759 (1963).
22 "It
is no part of the duty of a court to subordinate domestic interests to those
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the notion that weighing of states' interests in conflicts cases is a
proper judicial function by holding that the forum state's application of its own "legitimate" interest 33 is consistent with the full
faith and credit clause and will not be disturbed. 4 If weighing
legitimate state interests is not a proper function for the Supreme
Court, a fortiori such weighing should be foreclosed to the state
courts.3

Because of the court's conclusion that only Pennsylvania had an
interest in the effectuation of its policy in Griffith,30 it did not reach
the question of how true conflicts are to be decided. Griffith is
limited to an express repudiation of lex loci delecti and the adoption of an approach which analyzes asserted conflicts to determine
whether state interests actually are in conflict in the particular case.
Interestingly, it would seem that the court failed to recognize that
Griffith did in fact present a true conflict.
The court's examination of Colorado's possible interest entailed
consideration of that state's apparent reasons for enacting a survival
of a foreign state. The conflict must remain unresolved, unless it can be resolved
by political action. Resolution of a conflict between the interests of co-ordinate
states is a function of a high political order, which courts are not equipped to
perform. Id. at 758.
In the Griffith context, adherence to this view would dictate that the determination by Pennsylvania, embodied in the state constitution (see note 8 supra), that
damages recoverable in personal injury cases should not be limited by reason of the
death of the injured party should be given effect by the Pennsylvania court in all
cases in which the policy applies, until such time as the policy is properly changedin this case, by constitutional amendment.
"The term "legitimate public interest" was used by the Supreme Court in
summing up its opinion that California's application of its own statute was con.
sistent with due process in Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S.
532, 542 (1935). The term "legitimate interest" has been similarly employed by the
Court in Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955) and in Watson v. Employers
Liability Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). See Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly
to Judgments: A Role for Congress, 1964 Sup. Cr. REV. 89, 91-99.
"In Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939),
the Court, adverting to its "weighing" procedure in Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, supra note 33, said, "there would seem to be little room for the
exercise of that function when the statute of the forum is the expression of domestic
policy, in terms declared to be exclusive in its application to persons and events
within the state." 306 U.S. at 502-03. See note 27 supra. The Supreme Court applied
this philosophy in favor of application by a state of its common law rule: "The State
of the forum also has interests to serve and to protect." Carroll v. Lanza, supra note
33, at 412. Cf. Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965). See CURIuE, The Constitution and Choice of Law, in SELEcrED EssAYs ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 188, 20105 (1963).
5id.at 278.
"See note 13 supra.
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statute precluding recovery of a decedent's prospective earnings.37
The court first reasoned that the limitation was probably intended
to prevent Colorado courts from engaging in "speculative computation of future earnings," and that Colorado would be unconcerned
by Pennsylvania's readiness to make such computations. 38 What the
court apparently overlooked, however, is that the Colorado survival
statute does not preclude such computations by Colorado courts.
If a person is disabled rather than killed, for example, a Colorado
court assessing damages would be confronted with the necessity of
computing expected future earnings. 39 Thus it appears unlikely
that the policy underlying the Colorado limitation is avoidance of
judicial speculation in computing damages.
The court next considered the possibility that the Colorado
limitation might have been intended to "protect Colorado defendants from large verdicts." 40 This line of inquiry was cut short,
however, with the statement that although United does business in
Colorado, it is not domiciled there, and that it also does business in
other states which do not limit recovery. 41 Turning to Pennsylvania's interests, the court found that state "strongly" interested in
37 203 A.2d at 807. The court had first noted that no Colorado interest could, in
this case at least, be posited on the argument that the defendant had relied on
Colorado's policy of limiting damages, since the site of the accident had been "purely
fortuitous." Id. at 806. The court also reasoned that whatever interest Colorado
might have in the compensation of those who render aid to injured persons was not
assertable when, as here, death had been immediate. Id. at 807.
38 Ibid.

" See Moyer v. Merrick, 392 P.2d 653, 656 (Colo. 1964); King v. Avila, 127 Colo.
538, 259 P.2d 268 (1953).
On the other hand, it is possible that Colorado allows computation of probable
future earnings in suits involving injury only, but not where injury has resulted in
death, because of a belief that a decedent's dependents are usually life insurance
beneficiaries, while an injured man and his family are probably uncovered by disability
insurance.
10 203 A.2d at 807.

"Ibid. There appear to be two explanations for the court's disposition of the
point in this manner. Most apparent is that the court was simply excluding United
from the "Colorado defendant" category because it is not domiciled there and does
business elsewhere.
A second element seems to be that of pointing out that refusal to apply Colorado
law is not "unfair" to United, since it "could reasonably anticipate that it might
be subject to the laws of such states and could financially protect itself against
such eventuality." Ibid. This factor of fairness to the parties is considered by some
scholars to be important in deciding true conflicts. E.g., Cavers, supra note 15, at
164; Weintraub, supra note 2, at 239-42. Since the Griffith court discovered no true
conflict, and in light of its reliance upon analysis of state interests in reaching that
conclusion, its observation as to the fairness of its application of Pennsylvania law
would seem to be "make-weight."
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having its law given effect, due to its concern with the administration of the decedent's estate and the well being of his surviving dependents.4
The court did not discuss the likelihood that the Colorado statute
reflects a legislative policy of providing certain limitations upon
the liability of all entrepreneurs doing business in the state, whether
domiciled there or not. Such a policy might obtain, for example,
in order to encourage beneficial commercial activity in the state.43
If this is the purpose of the statute, Colorado was interested in
effectuation of its policy in Griffith; awarding damages in excess of
those allowed by Colorado's statute subverted that state's policy of
affording limited liability for defendants engaged in commercial
activity within the state. Thus it is at least arguable that Colorado
did have an interest in the application of its law in the instant case;
and since Pennsylvania was also interested in having its law applied
-an interest which was irreconcilable with that of Colorado-a true
conflict was present.
Although Griffith leaves unresolved the true conflict problem,
the court's clear reliance upon governmental interest analysis is
itself a significant development. Such an approach would seem to
reject the notion that courts require choice-of-law rules to guide
them in deciding, when conflict is asserted, what law to apply. Such
a system of rules is, according to its reporter, 44 the aim of the Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws. 45 In place of the few rules of
broad application (such as the place-of-injury rule) embraced by the
original Restatement," it is said that many rules of narrow application are required. 47 The paucity of precedent, however, requires that
48
"broad, flexible rules" must suffice for the present.
The Restatement (Second) rule applicable in a case such as
G'riffith would require application of the law of the state having "the
most significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties."40
42 203 A.2d at 807.

"Cf.
3
1964 DUxE L.J. 351, 357-58.
,"See Reese, supra note 2, at 680.
"RxAmENT (SECOND), CONFLCr OF LAWs (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964).
'4RETATEmNT, CONFIT oF LAWS (1934).
,7 Reese, sura note 2, at 680.
"8See id. at 681. This is more than simply re-stating existing law. Indeed, Pro-

fessor Reese states that the choice of law area is not ripe for restatement in that
sense. Ibid.
"9Both § 290 (Survival of Actions) and § 379 (a) (Personal Injuries) are controlled

by "The Most Significant Relationship" rule of § 379. Section 879 provides:
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This state would be ascertained by consideration of "important contacts" viewed with regard to "the issues, the character of the tort,
and the relevant purposes of the tort rules of the interested states." 50
Although it may be demonstrated that the rules of the Restatement
(Second) would permit the result reached in Grifilth, it is also evident that they would not require that result.51 Most important,
however, is recognition of the fact that the basic Griffith approach
to conflict of laws cannot be reconciled with that of the Restatement
(Second).
This incompatability may not be immediately apparent. The
Pennsylvania court, after discussing the Restatement (Second) and
noting the criticism which it has provoked, 52 concluded with the
statement that "almost all authorities agree that there must be a
' 53
policy analysis approach to replace the place of the injury rule.
This might seem to indicate approval of at least so much of the
Restatement (Second) approach as recognizes interest analysis.
Paradoxically, a decision based on such analysis would seem to repudiate the entire concept of choice-of-law rules such as the Restatement (Second) embodies. A court engaged in ascertaining the
policies behind seemingly conflicting state laws is unlikely to be
"The General Principle.
(1) The local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with
the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and libialities in tort.
(2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining the state of
most significant relationship include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct occurred,
(c) the domicile, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
(3) In determining the relative importance of the contracts, the forum will consider the issues, the character of the tort, and the relevant purposes of the tort rules

of the interested states."

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND),

CONFLIcT

OF

LAws § 379 (Tent.

Draft No. 9, 1964).
50 Ibid.
11 Comment d to § 379 stipulates that the state where the conduct and injury
occurred (usually given the "greatest weight"--see comment b) is not the state primarily concerned with the issue of survival of tort claims. Id. at 8-9.
However, even when both the plaintiff and defendant are domiciled in a state
other than the state of injury and conduct, that state's law need not control, but
"would seem" to have the greatest interest "ordinarily." Id. at 9.
"2203 A.2d at 802-03. See critics cited note 4 supra.
88 203 A.2d at 803.
11 "In determining the relative importance of the contacts, the forum will consider the issues, the character of the tort, and the relevant purposes of the tort rules
of the interested states." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONMuCr OF LAws § 379 (3) (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1964). (Emphasis added.) Comment f to § 379 states that such purposes
are "an important factor to be considered .... " Id. at 11.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

632

[Vol. 1965:623

concerned about an heirarchy of important contacts, or about which
55
contact is "as to most issues" to be "given the greatest weight.r
Analysis of "the relevant purposes of the tort rules of the interested
states" was the sole basis of decision in Griffith, not merely "an important factor to be considered.... ,,r,
55RESTATEMENT

(SECOND), CONFLICr OF LAWS

§ 379, comment b (Tent. Draft No. 9,

1964).
56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379, comment f (Tent. Draft No. 9,

1964).

